Component Classification#

Note

Document header

LoLa Component Classification		status: draft security: NO safety: ASIL_B
version: 1 realizes: wp__sw_component_class

doc__lola_comp_class		Generic Document

Classification of LoLa

LoLa version is as stated in the current reference integration’s release note.

Additional documentation considered:
Communication (doc__com) and Inter-process Communication (doc__com_ipc)

Step 1: Determine (P): the uncertainty of the Processes applied#

Apply the process measures to determine (P).
The result of a process measure shall have as outcome [HE, PE, NE]
- HE: High Evidence
- PE: Partly Evidence but Manageable
- NE: No Evidence

Table 95 Determine (P)#
Id	Indicator for applying process	Result	Rationale for result
1	Are rules, state-of-the art processes applied for the design, implementation and verification?	PE	The component was already qualified as part of an OEM SW platform safety case, but not all work products are available open source.
2	Are requirements available?	PE	See LoLa trlc available but not inspected according to S-CORE process - check inspection checklist delta and re-perform if needed
3	Are specifications for functionalities and properties available (architecture)?	PE	See LoLa arc and LoLa SW arc available but not inspected according to S-CORE process - check inspection checklist delta and re-perform if needed
4	Are design specifications available?	PE	LoLa/design available but not inspected according to S-CORE process - check inspection checklist delta and re-perform if needed
5	Are configuration specification and data available, if applicable?	HE	Configuration is done by the user by json files, explained in tutorial
6	Are verification measures including tests and reports available?	PE	Unit and integration tests available and configured failure blocks the merge of any lola pull request, evidences links see q-report and feat_req test report - need to find component test report Safety Analysis performed and documented in https://eclipse-score.github.io/communication/latest/docs/sphinx/mw_com_index/dependability_analysis/mw_com_dependability_analysis/safety_analysis.html

(P=1) shall be selected when none of the determined process measures indicate PE or NE.

(P=2) shall be selected when at least one of the determined process measures indicate PE or NE, but the gaps evaluated are acceptable, means

the risk of systematic faults due to these gaps is sufficiently low or manageable by mitigating the gaps.

(P=3) in all other cases.

lola is determined as P=2

Step 2: Determine (C): the uncertainty of finding systematic faults based on the Complexity#

Apply the complexity measures to determine (C).
The result of a complexity measure shall have as outcome [NH, HM, NM]
- NH: Not High
- HM: High but Manageable
- NM: high and Not Manageable

Complexity measure for programming language: C++

Table 96 Determine (C) for C++#
Id	Indicator for high Complexity	Complexity measure Tool	Result	Number
1	High amount of Lines of Code	Lines of Code (without comments) (generated code is excluded)	HM	>1000
2	Cyclomatic complexity	Static Code Analysis tooling	HM	was determined in external project and did not block qualification
3	Test exists / Coverage (Function, Line)	Existing Tests Coverage	NH	See coverage - missing coverage gaps in mw/com to be resolved
4	High amount of public function interfaces	Number of public function interfaces	HM	See https://eclipse-score.github.io/communication/latest/generated/api_index.html - interface is comparable to AUTOSAR standard, check if safety analysis full covers interface in Communication Safety Analys... (doc__communication_safety_analysis_fdr)
5	High amount of function parameters	Number of parameters	NH	see above

(C=1) shall be selected when none of the determined complexity measures indicate HM or NM.

(C=2) shall be selected when at least one of the determined complexity measures indicate HM or NM, but the gaps evaluated are acceptable, means

the risk of systematic faults due to these gaps is sufficiently low in the context of the project or manageable by mitigating the gaps.

(C=3) in all other cases.

lola is determined as C=2

Step 3: Determine (CLAS_OUT): the classification outcome#

Select CLAS_OUT depending on the determined values of (C) and (P)

( C )	( P )
	1	2	3
1	Q	Q	QR
2	QR	QR	QR
3	QR	QR	NQ

LoLa is classified as CLAS_OUT=QR

Step 4: Document all results and rationale for choosing (P) and (C) and (CLAS_OUT)#

This document

Step 5: Based on (CLAS_OUT) select the activities#

As soon as the change request containing this is in status “Accepted”, the module safety plan for the component development is adapted based on the following: (select according to above result)
- Q: Follow the processes for qualification of software components in a safety context.
- QR: Follow the process for pre-existing software architectural elements
- NQ: Do no use this element in safety context