DR-002-Arch: IPC implementation#

Date: 2026-08-11

Use socom as SOME/IP stack abstraction
status: accepted
context: SOME/IP Gateway
decision: Option 1 (mw::com / LoLa with GenericSkeleton and GenericProxy)
version: 1

Context / Problem#

Due to the ASIL and QM split of the gatewayd and someipd processes, an IPC mechanism is required to transport the semantics of the SOME/IP stack abstraction to each process.

Options Considered#

Option 1: mw::com / LoLa with GenericSkeleton and GenericProxy as IPC implementation#

This option would use mw::com / LoLa as the IPC implementation for transporting the semantics of the SOME/IP stack abstraction to each process. Gateway specific RPC calls are done via a dedicated mw::com service.

Pros:

  • Already safety qualified.

  • Keeps one primary communication abstraction in the architecture.

Cons:

  • Event-driven use cases not so well supported.

  • Configuring mw::com could become complex.

    • Assuming that a SOME/IP service is mapped to a mw::com service.

    • mw::com service configuration format might need SOME/IP specific extensions.

  • Overall complexity is high.

    • The SOME/IP Gateway does not need the full mw::com feature set.

Option 2: Use pure message_passing#

This option uses the message_passing building block of mw::com as the IPC implementation for transporting the semantics of the SOME/IP stack abstraction to each process.

Pros:

  • One mechanism that can handle everything.

Con:

  • Will create problems with safety certification later on. On QNX the caller is blocked if the server is not ready to be called. ⇒ Can’t be used in the safe execution phase.

  • Overhead for transferring the payload data via message passing.

Option 3: Use message_passing and shared_memory#

For implementation of the IPC binding building blocks of mw::com are reused. These are namely:

  • message_passing: for message transport between processes

  • shared_memory: for shared memory management at each process

Pros:

  • Can transfer data within shared memory ⇒ Zero-copy.

  • Can use safe mechanisms for signalling in the safe execution phase (e.g. Pulses).

Cons:

  • Will add some effort in qualification.

Evaluation#

Option 1 would build on top of mw::com with code reuse and inheriting its safety qualification.

Option 2 is singled out due to the lack of zero-copy support.

Option 3 leads to writing lots of IPC handling code for both message passing and shared memory. It then must also be safety qualified, which adds additional effort and complexity.

Decision#

Option 1 was selected: the IPC implementation is based on mw::com.

Consequences#

  • The integration between the gatewayd and someipd daemons is based on socom interfaces.

  • mw::com is the IPC transport between the daemons.

  • socom remains the service abstraction at the gateway boundary, bridged through the mw::com binding.

References#